

Nation Building and Social Control: Observations from Ivory Coast and Tanzania

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Crime control is but one of many areas of life where governments attempt to influence the lives of their citizens through formal state institutions. Within the context of Third World countries, the 'reality' of government as nation is something which must be tested if we are to interpret more accurately comparative crime and crime control information.

Utilizing Eckstein's distinction between 'social-polity' and 'political society,' this paper analyzes observations from the Ivory Coast and Tanzania and attempts to demonstrate the practical utility of viewing crime control efforts within the more general context of the nation-building process. Within the context of nation-building, we can 1) better understand the implications of the "nationhood assumption" for comparative criminological research; 2) better interpret "social defense" efforts in the Third World context; and 3) better see the implications of government penetration into private decisions in the developed world.

THIS PAPER FOCUSES on one of the unspoken assumptions of comparative criminal justice studies focusing on Third World nations: i.e., that the nations we study and compare in the Third World are indeed nations in more than a geographical sense. As Anise observes, "... calling a given geographical area a nation does not make it one. Other more esteemed characteristics may continue to divide people in a corral, more than a national name can unite them." (Anise, 1977: 315)¹ Here, Anise focuses our attention on the people's identification with the nation. From a criminal justice perspective, however, our interest centers on the degree to which the governments in the Third World care to and are able to exert influence to control the behavior of their citizens to achieve some specified ends. After all, this is the essence of our modern conception of crime control.

In the context of Third World settings, crime control may be looked upon as simply one among many areas where governments attempt to influence the lives of their citizens through "formal state institutions." This process seems to involve the substitution of government goals and processes for more private goals and processes.² Whether it involves increasing agricultural production, providing educational services, or designing new housing patterns, the extent to which governments are effectively able to achieve their ends might serve as an indicator of the degree to which the "nationhood" assumption is warranted.

In discussing the problems involved in defining crime in international contexts Louise Shelley's *Crime and Modernization* provides an illustration of the difficulties the nationhood assumption creates in criminal justice studies. Shelley notes that "... variations [in crime definitions] exist because a country's criminal code is a reflection of its political and economic system as well as of its national culture" (Shelley, 1981: xvii). Though Shelley is correct to note the definitional problem,³ focusing on the "criminal code" (a national instrument) and "national culture" betrays the assumption that a national entity exists in an operational sense, and that the national criminal code and national culture are meaningful concepts to the people inhabiting a nation. It also assumes that governments possess the will and the machinery to make these instruments effective. Wilkins warns of this definitional trap when he says, "the key to this difficulty seems to be separating the measures of 'problems' from measures of what is done about them. Measures of 'activity' by government agencies cannot act as very satisfactory data for the problems addressed. Arrests, for example, do not measure crimes—even if we wanted to measure crimes" (Wilkins, 1980: 32).

By drawing our attention to the observation that "crime" is more directly a reflection of government activity than of individual behavior, Wilkins asks us to consider the degree to which government agencies, police, courts, corrections as well as other government agencies and activities exist and *effectively* operate. These questions are particularly relevant to studying crime and social control in Third World settings.

With independence, new indigenous governments in Africa and older nations in Latin America faced and continue to face problems of "nation-building," of increasing the ability of the state to influence the lives of its people and of building allegiance to, and identification with the state governmental apparatus. (Pye, 1966: 64) In the context of criminal justice this process involves police replacing neighbors as mechanisms of order maintenance, rationalized external courts substituting for the "council of elders," and punishment and enforced sentences taking the place of negotiated and mediated solutions to disputes (Abel, 1979: 169-175).

That this process is still problematic even in "developed" sectors of African states receives support from recent research. Yves Brillion, after describing research into the use of government and traditional mechanisms of social control in West Africa, concludes:

Research conducted in Ibadan and Abidjan shows that tribal justice—even today and even for major offenses—appeals to the majority of the native African population. Some experts argue that traditional forms of settlement are on the increase. Obviously, the new codes and administrative mechanisms are better suited to city dwellers than the rural majority population. Nevertheless, even in the cities, where the agglomeration of different ethnic groups necessitates the existence of a common law, the inefficiencies of the official criminal justice system contribute to the growth of primitive justice. Cases of tribal justice and lynchings are reportedly on the rise. This leads us to believe that modern jus-

tice is not only ill suited to traditional modes of thought but also incapable of dealing with the new criminality of the cities (Brillion, 1983: 3).

What Brillion's observations suggest is that the process of nation-building is far from complete in the African context. If this is so, a more thorough exploration of the processes of nation-building and the extension of government social control needs to be made if we are to understand the "national entities" we discuss when undertaking comparative criminological studies.

A General Framework for Exploring Nation-Building and Social Control:

Eckstein (1980) in discussing the "idea of political development" provides a conceptual framework useful for categorizing exploratory observations concerning social control and nation-building that follow. Defining as *political* "any relations that involve, say, legitimate power, or conflict management or the regulation of social conduct, and the like" (p. 470), Eckstein constructs a continuum of political development through time. This continuum ranges from the "social polity," on the one hand to the "political society," on the other.¹ As Eckstein describes it:

The passage from social polity to political society can be described summarily: the domain of the princes, who at the outset do virtually nothing, has great, indeed irresistible potential for growth: power resources. Over a long period, these power resources are gradually realized. *The chiefs of society convert headship into primacy, and primacy into actual control.* (Eckstein, 1982: 471-472).

Put simply, what develops in political development is politics as such, the extension of government (princely) control to the lives of people who inhabit a particular geographical space, and the transfer from "people" to governments of responsibilities for activities.

With this conceptual framework in mind, the remainder of this paper will explore the extent to which the "nation-building" process described above (i.e., the transformation from social polity to political society) has been achieved in two highly diverse countries: Ivory Coast and Tanzania. The data on which this report is based are highly impressionistic, but being an exploratory study, I believe this is justified. The material was gathered during May and June 1983 when I and an interdisciplinary group of 12 colleagues from universities in Southeastern Virginia traveled and studied for three weeks in each of the countries mentioned. This travel was part of a larger Fulbright-Hayes grant designed to enhance faculty development in Third World studies for the eventual infiltration of Third World perspectives and content into the general university curriculum.

As we traveled, meetings and seminars were held with government officials (including the President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere), representatives of political parties and development officers. Visits were made to development projects, villages, and universities. Seminars were held with university

faculty specializing in education, literature, the Fine Arts, women's affairs, labor unions, the media, and medicine. In addition, informal discussions with Americans and Europeans studying, living, and/or working in these countries provided valuable information. "People-on-the-street" and in the markets also served as informants. In addition to our group schedule, each participant also had opportunities for individual appointments. In Ivory Coast, I visited with the President of the Supreme Court, toured a prison and spent three hours with its director, and spent a number of hours with the director of the Institute of Criminology at the University of Abidjan. In Tanzania, my contacts included the country's two top prison officials and a number of black market currency salesmen. My impressions from these experiences will be presented under a number of headings: Ethnic and Tribal Identifications vs. Nation-state identification, Defenses of the State, National vs. Tribal Dispute Settlement, Dependency on Social Services. Observations will be drawn from my field notes and will be presented as a collage with commentaries demonstrating my attempt to make sense out of seemingly random observations. I will not attempt to explain differences between the two countries, or why particular patterns seem to emerge; that is for further work. Here, I simply wish to explore the nation-building process and to provide some evidence concerning how it is taking place in two African countries.

Ethnic and Tribal Identifications vs. Nation-State Identification

With regard to ethnic groups (over 60 in Ivory Coast) and the transforming of tribal identities into a national identity, there seem to be few effective efforts in Ivory Coast. National identity cards are issued and births are registered at the Prefecture of Police. Reportedly, a person's "civil status" is nil without a national identity card. However, it appears that the identity card is more a device to control "non-Ivorians" (other west Africans coming into this prosperous country from Senegal, Upper Volta, Mali, and Ghana) than it is to control the access of Ivorians to "social services" (i.e., goods from the princely domain). Indeed, the road blocks we constantly encountered in our travels, and the police stops of automobiles on all roadways seemed to be checking for foreign nationals (in addition to the collection of tips), rather than controlling the behaviors of Ivorians. For Ivorians, the cards seem to be associated with a system of repression. Amadeu Kone's novel *The Identity Card* deals with the Africans' search for identity in response to its stripping by the colonial powers. Identity is found in the tribe or Africanness rather than in the nation, another indication that the cards have not fostered the nation-building process of overcoming tribal identity.

Other attempts to transcend tribal identification and loyalty are made by the media. Educational TV offers courses aimed at health and agriculture. In addition, civics courses were (are no longer) presented with the expressed purpose of fostering national identity. Over the radio, in between commercials and western music, one hears "Jamu, Jamu" (Courage) replied to with

"Ya" (a form of assent) exhorting workers to solidarity and more production. The effects of such media efforts appear to be minimal. Television is virtually non-existent outside of major urban areas, and too costly for the 80% to 90% of the population not counted among the elite. Radio, though more visible even in villages, is also ineffective at prompting subsistence farmers to produce more. In the urban, industrial sectors of Abidjan, perhaps it means more.

These attempts to build national identity are countered by the efforts of national elites to recognize tribal identity in various ways. Positions in the various ministries are distributed according to tribal identity to avoid internal governmental friction. Political associations between villages and politics are not viewed from the "impersonal" frame of reference of the "political society," but rather in the "personal" tribal perspective of "I know someone, who knows someone, who knows someone, who knows someone in the ministry." Villagers with tribal identification are not tied to the "national polity," but rather to the local level. They are tied to the national level only by extension of immediate personal contacts.

In Ivory Coast, language is also a problem in nation-building. Although French is the national language, the spread of French to the tribal areas appears minimal, limiting the people's access to the government that is French and the government's access to the people whose language is not French. Television also reflects regional differences, broadcasting dances, music, and news relevant to specific regions.

In the villages, tribal customs appear to be followed with little interference from the government. From excision to infanticide (associated with the *number*, the birth of a child represents or the child's sex in relation to its siblings) there appears to be little government effort to interfere. Though polygamy is on the books as a criminal offense, it is widely practiced even among the elite in urban areas. In fact, a theatrical production set in an upper middle class family involved the conflicts between a man's two wives.

In Ivory Coast the African arts are a reflection of tribal identity. The techniques and forms belong to the Senoufo, the Baoule, or the Malinke. No attempt is made to "Ivorianize" these cultural artifacts. Even skills such as weaving, cloth painting, and blacksmithing are associated with specific villages and are not thought of or discussed as a *national* resource.

In Tanzania, it quickly became apparent that efforts aimed at transforming tribal identity (more than 130 groups) into a national identity were very strong and purposeful as a matter of national policy. These efforts reflect the struggle of the nation to achieve primacy over the tribe. For Eckstein, this struggle to clarify the domain of public life is a necessary condition for the development of the political society (Eckstein, 1981: 476).

Tanzanian efforts at overcoming tribal identity are selective, however, dealing only with those matters deemed to be counter to national goals. For example, there are no national laws against polygamy; this practice is left to local custom. Divorce is handled in traditional ways, with techniques vary-

ing from place to place. Other family matters might be regulated by law; however, the national law is there only as a last resort, with such concerns being left to local customs.

Discussions with a regional development officer in Arusha provided much insight into the national identity building practices. This man is a Masai, one of the most independent of the tribal groups in Tanzania. As we began our discussions, he was asked if he would discuss Masai customs. (A subject of much curiosity in our group.) He responded, "I will, if I can remember!" Seemingly, it was not proper to talk about tribal ways in Tanzania. (In Ivory Coast, tribal village identity was a primary form identification for everyone from the President of the Republic on down.) As reported by the development officer:

"In Tanzania, we (the princely domain) don't encourage anything that is counter to national policies. The Masai don't eat certain things and we don't think it's a good thing to do. We think the things they do are stupid things. We don't see anything that is so good in one culture as opposed to another. Language has made this possible. Any culture that is contrary to the kind of national culture we are trying to build, we will do away with that." (June 15, 1983: Field notes)

Cultural selectivity manifests itself in a number of ways. The wood carvings of the Makunde tribe, for example, are considered to be national symbols, not merely representative of the tribe. Ujaama carvings representing national unity are a national art form. Traditional songs, music, and dances from tribal groups have been transformed into expressions of national unity, as words singing the praises of Tanzania and Julius Nyerere replace references to the tribe, while Masai songs which exhort people to steal cattle are denigrated as contrary to the goals of Tanzanian society. One received the impression that in Tanzania tribal culture is "preserved" not "lived" as it is in Ivory Coast. The "sacred" meanings attached to village cultural life in Ivory Coast (the characteristic of a social polity) become transformed into public meanings in Tanzania (a characteristic of the political society).

Initiation practices in the two countries also demonstrate the different approaches taken to tribal identity. In Ivory Coast initiation practices are sacred. In the villages, although time periods are being shortened by some tribes, initiations in the "sacred forest" are as they always were. The content of the initiation is not discussed in public. Animism dominates spiritual beliefs. This is in evidence even among urbanized upper class Ivoirians. To discuss such rituals with outsiders would be to profane their significance, a most unpardonable offense. In Tanzania, on the other hand, we were informed that books are being written about the initiation practices of each tribe. Such practices are being brought into the open for discussion so that people can decide what is good and, in the process, eliminate that which is bad, contrary to State goals.

The national language of Tanzania (referred to above) is Swahili, a trade language that belongs to no tribal group, but is yet fairly common to all.

With a national literary rate of over 66% in Swahili, even higher in younger age groups, the spread of a national culture into most regions of the country is facilitated since the language of government is the language of the people, a condition not existing in Ivory Coast.

Defenses of the State

Another level at which nation-building can be explored is that of the "prophylactic" polity where, ". . . the overriding objective of the prince is to detect and disarm usurpation, while that of others is to seize or control the principality" (Eckstein, 1981: 478). In both countries forms of political dissent, its presence, and how it was dealt with often surfaced as a topic of discussion. This is the case even though both countries have had remarkable political stability since independence. Both have had only one head of state—Houphouet-Boigny in Ivory Coast and Julius Hyerere in Tanzania—and both have single party political organizations.

In Ivory Coast issues of dissent were related to recent strikes (one by university faculty and teachers); the role of literature, theatre, and media as mechanisms of dissent; the place of the French in national economic and political life; and political corruption. With regard to political dissent, a professor of Ivorian literature at the University of Abidjan put it this way:

In Ivory Coast it is O.K. to discuss and criticize politically, as long as you don't create any political action. Political life is such here that during certain critical periods I have been spied upon—there may be oppression to a certain point. There are students who do that kind of spy work.

Discussion and criticism in the media are monitored, however, by a censorship committee in the office of the Ministry of Information. Material that "provokes" is carefully scrutinized and kept out of newspapers. Films must pass through this committee. Reportedly, there have been times when films carrying blatantly political messages were removed from circulation, allegedly because of the "swearing" language they contained. When a history professor at the University spoke about the advantages and disadvantages of moving the political capital of the country from Abidjan to Yamasoukro, people from his region put notices in the newspapers saying that he spoke for himself, not for them.

At the University there had reportedly been moves to establish some sort of political activism. However, student housing patterns, according to some, were designed to minimize opportunities for student interaction. Such housing was scattered all over Abidjan and its environs, rather than being located in the immediate vicinity of the university, creating competition for prime housing and requiring student movement away from campus. Lacking an easily accessible focus and fearing losing or not obtaining prime housing, students were easily controlled by being divided.

Strikes were another sign of popular discontent in Ivory Coast. However, such worker "attacks" on the princely domain, though recognized as a

"right" in the constitution, were reportedly lacking in direct political consciousness. In a country inhabited predominately by rural peasants, the demands of urban workers, though possibly threatening to the urban, elite regions of Abidjan, do nothing to arouse political action on a national level. When strikes do arise, they are dealt with as expressions of disloyalty to the party and to the country. A strike of workers at a major hotel was reportedly "settled" by firing all the workers and replacing them. Other strikes are put down by the police.

While the "prophylactic" polity copes with disagreements among the urban elites, it does not concern itself with the non-politicized rural majority in Ivory Coast. Evidence of political prophylaxis is, however, much more pervasive in Tanzania. Though police were definitely present in Ivory Coast, in Tanzania the visibility of police and military walking the street with rifles *made* one feel their presence. In Ivory Coast anything was "photographable" for a price; in Tanzania many people literally ran from cameras, not wanting their pictures taken, reportedly for fear of reprisals. In Ivory Coast entrance into any government building was controlled by "guardians" who after appropriate exchange of conversation and receipt of a "gift" would help arrange for access. In Tanzania every meeting was accompanied by the signing of a "guest book," the keeping of a record for some future reference.

Discontent in Tanzania concerned more basic issues than in Ivory Coast as one member of our group reported in the following conversation:

I was talking with a man down by the point. He was unemployed. He spoke about the new law requiring all able bodied persons in urban areas to work or else be moved to the countryside to be involved in agriculture. This guy said people were getting more and more fed up with Nyerere. Consumer goods were getting harder and harder to find. This is a constant theme here—people don't have time to do their daily business because they have to spend so much time looking for necessities: sugar, cornmeal, soap. All sorts of things are in short supply and have been for a while. If they try physically to enforce this law, the man said there would be a revolution. (Field notes, June 27, 1983)

At an Embassy party in honor of our group, I spoke with a man concerning the new "vagrancy" law. He agreed with the law, saying, "They must be involved in illegal activities if they don't work, stealing or something. These people have to contribute." I commented how everyone seems to be involved in the activities of the nation and how the national political party contributes to that. "Yes," he said. "Everyone knows even down to the basic level. Even your innermost thoughts." This theme of political surveillance through the party mechanisms emerged in conversations with party officials, academics, Americans raised in Tanzania, and university faculty. Political surveillance through a party mechanism organized down to the level of ten family cells seems to have had the "prophylactic" effect in relation to dissent.

One final form of political prophylaxis in Tanzania is "political education." The purposes of the Tanzanian state, the goals of government are emphasized in primary education. The government campaign against

"economic saboteurs" reportedly has led to contests among school children to compose songs condemning the saboteur's activities as harmful to the nation. In villages, plays and theatrical productions are used to communicate national problems and proposed government solutions. Even in prisons, political education forms part of the rehabilitation program for every prisoner.

Dispute Settlement Processes

In moving from social polity to political society, "the increasingly practical responsibility for the management of conflicts, and the emergence of specialized institutions to handle these functions" (Eckstein, 1982: 478) by the princely domain sets the stage for the growth of government penetration into people's daily lives. Controlling management of conflict in African societies has been a problem of colonialism and continues in the post-colonial era. The degree to which state controlled dispute settlement mechanisms have been imposed upon tribal (traditional) legal apparatus (Burman and Harrell-Bond, 1979), thus, becomes an indicator of the nation-building process and the ability of the state to exert control over the affairs of its people.

In Ivory Coast, the use of government dispute settlement mechanisms (civil and criminal courts) appears to be limited to major urban areas and even there to specific issues. According to one informant, people in the cities are starting to sue more over land-related issues. Doctors are being taken to court over malpractice controversies. These trends were linked to an increase in "selfishness" in certain segments of the Ivory Coast population. The increase in the number of robberies in Abidjan was drawing attention along with auto theft rings. Though these civil and criminal matters are becoming important in cities, the ability of state dispute settlement mechanisms to control conflict depends on the willingness of people to use them, and/or on the ability of enforcement mechanisms to become knowledgeable about these conflicts; i.e., for the "law to be mobilized." (Black, 1978)

In Ivory Coast, it is here, at the enforcement level, that the national system breaks down. Without question in the rural areas and to some degree in the urban areas, traditional or tribal mechanisms for handling both civil and criminal matters dominate (see Brillion comments cited above). As one informant described it:

In the villages people don't rob. When they go to the cities, they go their own way. If someone did steal in the villages, you will never know. They would drive the person out of the village, or they would kill them. In the Lagoon area, in Grand-Bassam (near Abidjan) they might say that they are taking the person out of the village and sending them back home. They would then take the person out in a boat, tie a stone around his neck and throw them into the water. No one will ever know, they'd keep the secret, not even the police will ever know. People don't tell such things to the police. Police are sworn to do their duty and report such things to the state, they can no longer

treat you like someone from the villages. So people learn early not to trust the police and have dealings with them. (Field notes: May 31, 1983)

When she went to the police to report her car stolen, one informant reported being told, "Madam, if you want us to do something, buy us gas, cars, and we will try to do something." (Field notes: June 4, 1983) The time, energy, and resources which the formal system demands lead people to handle offenders as they would in the village, even when problems emerge in the cities.

In rural areas, disputes are still handled in traditional ways. The presence of the state is minimal. References to the spiritualism, witchcraft, the council of elders, and long-extended negotiations over marriage disputes, landholdings and family ties dominated. One informant, for example, described how in Senoufo country people who attempt to leave another's hut with stolen property will be unable to do so because they will fall into a hole. The hole will not be visible, but the person will be in it. Until the property is replaced the person will be stuck. Here, in rural areas almost no mention was made of cases "going to court." Even the president of the Supreme Court focused his attention on cases that reached his office, not on the fact that most situations were handled in traditional ways, outside of state mechanisms.

In Tanzania, even though there are primary courts at the division level (the level of organization above that of villages) it was reported that many disputes are settled at the village level according to villages' customs rather than national law. While enforcement efforts outside of cities in Ivory Coast appear minimal (except for road blocks where police check papers to discover foreign nationals), in Tanzania it is reported that there are police at the regional, district, and division levels. Even in geographically very large districts special posts are created for police.

When asked to discuss the state judicial system, many reported that it was unjust and ineffective. They believed that it did not reconcile the parties in disputes. The traditional ceremonies and sacrifices allowed for disputes to be completed; but now it seems, according to some, that court cases and the increase in formalism keeps the state in the people's business forever. Though some ethnic groups in rural areas might still use traditional dispute settlement forms, in cities and towns the formal state system dominates. The availability of court services in villages and the organization of political parties makes the use of formal mechanisms more likely.

In Tanzania there was almost no discussion of spiritualism, witchcraft, and social control through traditional means. Possibly such discussion was viewed as anti-Tanzanian, a reflection of tribal identification and, therefore, taboo. However, even some Americans who had grown up in Tanzania and who lived for years among the Masai confirmed the penetration of state dispute settlement processes into many aspects of people's lives.

Extension of Government Services

One final way in which the nation-state manifests itself in people's daily lives is through the provision of services, and in the taking over of functions formally belonging to the people. Medical services, road building, education, licensing boards, state cooperatives for production and the distribution of goods, regulation of labor, all bring the government more directly into day-to-day life. This is especially important when national governments are attempting to carry out "development plans" geared to producing economic growth. Implicit in centralized development planning is the notion that the state will find ways of controlling the behavior of its population so that plans can be realized.

In Ivory Coast it appears that government penetration in the form of services is minimal, especially in the rural areas. Medical services outside of major urban areas are virtually non-existent. A major hospital serving people not only from Ivory Coast but from other areas of West Africa is located in Ferkessedougou near the country's northern border with Upper Volta. This hospital is not a government hospital, but was founded and has been run by American Baptist missionaries since 1952. Its courtyard contains areas for families to cook food over wood/coal fires. It has no air conditioning, and depends on open windows and an occasional fan for ventilation (a problem in the windy season when surrounded by unpaved roads). What hospitals exist are generally elite oriented. However, as one official put it, "the best medical care in Ivory Coast is the Swiss Air Flight to Geneva."

In Tanzania, on the other hand, it seems that every village has a dispensary of some sort. These dispensaries provide primary health care, information on birth control, sanitation, and other health related services. Following the 1972 Arsha Declaration which brought "socialism" to Tanzania, the health ministry was reorganized to give primary emphasis to the development of rural health services. Through educational efforts in schools children are taught from an early age that these services are available. (Gross statistics reflect the differences between the two countries. Ivory Coast with a per capita income of \$1290 in 1980 had an infant mortality rate of 170/1000 and life expectancy of 44 years. Tanzania, on the other hand, with a per capita income of \$230 had an infant mortality rate of 125/1000 and life expectancy of 50.5 years.) (U.S. Department of State, 1980)

Educational efforts by the two countries exhibit the same general pattern. While one finds elite oriented engineering schools (staffed mostly by non-Ivorians), law faculties, medical schools and universities, primary education in the rural areas is not an important contributor. The unwillingness of trained teachers to go to the villages and the language difficulties prevent the penetration of the state into these affairs. In Tanzania, on the other hand, education into the rural areas has been a primary national objective. In every village, next to the Health Center, one sees a school (and next to the school, a political party office). While the elite training centers are meager at best, even at the universities, the practical education and literacy emphasis at the primary level demonstrates greater government

penetration. Again, gross statistics provide some indication of government success at penetrating into people's daily lives. Ivory Coast literacy rate in French was 24% in 1980, compared to Tanzania where it was 66% in Swahili in 1980. (U.S. Department of State, 1980)

The efforts of the Tanzanian government to bring services to the people in rural areas have been explicit and put into practice. The "villagization" projects of the 1970's attempting to bring people to the services reflect this. Where population density was such that it was impractical to bring pure water, education, health, sanitation, services to each settlement, efforts were undertaken to bring people to the services. Where resistance was offered, this process involved forcible removal of people by police and the burning of villages. As stated earlier, personal preferences counter to government policies designed to bring progress have low priority. In Ivory Coast, such efforts are non-existent.

Summary and Implications

Though both countries explored in this study exhibit characteristics of both the social polity and the political society, it would appear that Tanzania is much further along in building a nation than is Ivory Coast. By forging national identification over tribal unity, integrating politics and social control to defend the state, controlling interpersonal conflicts and increasing popular depending on government services, Tanzanian government has definitely emerged as first and without equal in the struggle for control over relations involving conflict management, regulation of social conduct and legitimate power (Eckstein, 1980: 470). In Ivory Coast, on the other hand, concentration on development of urban elites rather than the rural populations, strong ties to the French, rather than to internal concerns; the neglect of social services in favor of "conspicuous consumption" by government have led to a weakness in the "national fabric." As one anthropologist observed about the Ivory Coast: "There is little except the name to make this a country."

In terms of comparative criminological studies what might this exploration of "nationhood" mean? First, it might imply that comparative criminological studies which seek to compare "nations" (especially in Third World contexts) must consider the possibility that what are being compared might actually not exist. That is, one cannot safely assume that the institutions of government have successfully penetrated into peoples' lives to such an extent that such concepts as "criminal code" and "crime" (as harm against the State) have any real meaning. Indeed, as I have attempted to show, such concepts as government, law enforcement and crime might be totally alien to vast numbers of a nation's inhabitants. Here Wilkins' warning that "crime" is an artifact of government activities not simply a deviant form of human behavior takes on added significance.

Secondly, the type of analysis carried out here might indicate that the "social defense" efforts undertaken by many nation states might better be

conceived of as "regime defense" efforts or at best, elite defense efforts. This situation would exist where most people in a nation are outside of the sphere of government influence. In Ivory Coast, for example, where the reach of the nation is extremely limited, crime control aims at urban crime and international smuggling. Efforts to curb corruption in political circles (reportedly a significant fact of life) which siphons off untold dollars—not then available for medical and educational services—do not exist. Hence, the mass of society is not defended (against disease) while the elite attempts to protect itself against crime.

Finally, the perspective offered here may lead us to rethink the way we think about and study crime and criminal justice in our own country. It might force us to wonder about how much farther our institutions of government have actually penetrated into our equivalent of the village level, i.e., those social relations we still consider private, those conflicts over which people, not government, exert control. Private justice, private social control, mediation (even of behavior considered criminal) beg to be more thoroughly explored, and in the process our own criminological studies may gain new vitality. (Henry, 1983)

NOTES

This unspoken assumption concerning nationhood is not unique to criminal justice studies. Murray Edelman explores the same problem with respect to the study of international relations:

The key term in discussions of international relations is 'nation' and it is exactly here that an unintentional assumption may prove enlightening and point to analytical possibilities not inhibited by age-old semantic confusions. Is it really useful to take for granted, as common sense suggests and as both the popular and most of the academic discussions of international politics conventionally do, that it *is nations* that are in conflict: that the nation is the unit that has adversary interests, bargains and is therefore the appropriate unit of analysis?

Clearly, the nation is a gross entity. With respect to any issue occasioning international conflict there are readily identifiable group interests within the nation, some opposing each other and many indifferent or quiescent. If, as a long line of political theory in domestic politics suggests, we assume that it is the interests of specific groups with shared attitudes rather than a 'national interest' that explain the course of affairs, some new perspectives, new lines of analysis, and new strategic possibilities at once come into focus. (Murray Edelman, *Politics as Symbolic Action*. Chicago: Markham, 1971, p. 155.)

An illustration of how this "nation-building" process was at work in the United States well into the twentieth century is provided by Harry Caudill in this description of the extension of government into areas of rural Kentucky:

Until a generation ago the mountaineer was accustomed to 'turn out' for road working and other undertakings for community betterment. He was not paid and he did not expect to be. His willingness to work on roads and other essential projects was a holdover from the frontier where no government or government largesse existed. However, as government expanded and its benefits multiplied the old sturdiness be-

gan to dissolve. Though many frontier modes and outlooks survive and are sharply impressive, the traumas of fifty years have left a lasting imprint on the character of the mountaineer. His forefathers lived by the Frontier maxim 'root hog or die.' They would be astounded if they could return in the spirit to behold their descendents thronging to the office of the county judge to implore this assistance in a multitude of situations which, in an earlier time, would have been not by citizens without it once occurring to them that help from any other quarter was either responsible or desirable. (Harry M. Caudill, "Law in a Rural Setting," in William Chambliss (ed) *Criminal Law in Action*. Santa Barbara, CA: Goodyear, 1975, (322-328), p. 323).

The implications of the 'nation-building' perspectives described here for understanding criminal justice problems in comparative perspectives is highlighted by Yves Brillion in his discussion of formal criminal code legal definitions in the African context. Brillion observes with regard to legal definition:

There can also be seen a superimposition of two concepts of criminality: one based on modern, codified legislation and the other on old customary law. By imposing a criminal code, acts once considered non-criminal were criminalized, such as polygamy, the use of dowry, witchcraft, abortion, infanticide, etc. If there appears to be relatively little crime in Africa, it is apparently because some of the crimes or offenses are absorbed by the old social structures. The people continue to refer to the customary laws or refuse to reveal "legal" crimes, which they look upon as senseless or harmless. Thus the dark figure of crime could actually be quite high in Africa (Yves Brillion, "Development and Crime in Africa," *First West African Conference in Comparative Criminology*, Abidjan, Ivory Coast, 1972 (p. 32).

Beyond the 'dark-figure' problem Brillion's comments indicate that the assumption that 'national' mechanisms have been effectively substituted for private mechanisms is questionable in the African context.

According to Eckstein:

In the social polity, as a pure type, there exists a "princely" domain: some institution of leadership of society, chieftancy, firstness. That domain, though, is little separated from others, in the sense of having separate organizations, and administrative staffs; it is anything but a subsociety—neither a "machine" nor a "system" in itself. Above all, *next to nothing is done by princes* (emphasis added), at least as we understand political activity; *there is almost no active princely management of society*. (Emphasis added.) The society is virtually all, and the polity virtually nothing. Relations of power exist, regulation of conduct and conflicts occur but they do so throughout society, not in special relation to chieftancy.

At the other pole is *political society*. In political society as a pure type, "private" relations have been wholly preempted by the "public" domain of chiefs. The institutions of that domain are highly differentiated and separately organized: governmental offices and staffs constitute a large subsociety. That subsociety is a complex system in itself. While at the same time *it permeates social life*. (H. Eckstein, "The Idea of Political Development," *World Politics*, 34(4) July 1982 451-486 (p. 470).

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